

**An Intermarket Approach to Tactical Risk Rotation
Using the Signaling Power of Treasuries to Generate Alpha and
Enhance Asset Allocation**

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Introduction

Traditional asset allocation argues for maintaining an appropriate mix of asset classes weighted based upon one's individual risk and return profile. This methodology commands static execution, disregarding the potential to enhance performance through the tactical identification of conditions which may favor one asset class over another. In this paper, we propose an alternative approach, using intermarket behavior within the Treasury market as a signal to re-position a portfolio based on changing conditions.¹

Observing the behavior of the Treasury market has always been of special importance to the Federal Reserve, economists, and market participants given the leading nature of the yield curve. Much of the prior research has focused on the spread between short duration and long duration bonds. This spread, or the Treasury term structure, has been shown in academic literature to be a leading indicator of oncoming recessions and credit risk.² However, to the best of our knowledge, no strategy has used the total return and relative strength of two bonds of different durations as an indicator of future asset class returns and volatility. While the yield curve may be indicative of economic behavior, we find that total return intermarket behavior proves to be a strong indicator of near-term volatility in

¹ Intermarket analysis focuses on the relationships that exist within and across various asset classes in an effort to identify lead-lag behavior which may be exploitable for active managers.

² See Estrella and Mishkin (1996).

equities, which in turn provides a roadmap for enhancing asset allocation decisions.

The importance of asset allocation has been documented in numerous studies over the last several decades. Brinson, Hood, and Beebower (1986) noted that over 90% of the variability in a portfolio's performance was due to asset allocation policy, while Ibbotson and Kaplan (2000) argued that "on average, policy accounted for a little more than all of total return." Much of the reasoning behind this relates to the idea brought forth by Sharpe (1991) who argued that the average performance across all investors must equate to the market, and as such after fees and expenses active return from security selection is negated. This is one of the primary reasons why passive indexing has been shown to produce superior results relative to mutual funds in the long-term.³ This is also a central tenet of the Efficient Market Hypothesis which states that no strategy can consistently outperform a simple buy and hold investment.

However, several studies have called into question the Efficient Market Hypothesis, as certain market anomalies have been persistent and exploitable.⁴ Momentum is one such anomaly which has been well

³ See Day, Wang, and Xu (2001).

⁴ See Philip and Torbey (2002).

documented in the stock market.⁵ Recent research indicates that persistence of returns at the one month interval is not only an equity phenomenon, but also applies to bonds.⁶ Therefore, if we accept that asset allocation accounts for all of a portfolio's return but reject the idea that active management can't outperform, then the focus should be on choosing an appropriate active strategy to guide portfolio tilts. Prior studies have shown the potential benefits of using relative price momentum in making tactical asset allocation decisions.⁷ Our strategy is unique in that we are using the relative momentum within one asset class (Treasuries) as a signal for both tactical asset allocation decisions and impending changes in volatility.

By tracking the relative performance of intermediate and longer duration Treasuries, we document a powerful way to outperform traditional asset allocation strategies on both a return and risk-adjusted return basis. Broadly speaking, when the total return of longer duration Treasuries outperforms that of intermediate duration Treasuries, volatility in equities for the following month tends to rise and bond momentum drift continues. When the opposite signal occurs, stocks become the preferred asset class. We refer to this idea as Tactical Risk Rotation due to the timing of stock and

⁵ See Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999).

⁶ See Luu and Yu (2012).

⁷ See Lewis (2012).

bond rotations around information the bond market is providing about near-term volatility changes.

Using total return indices provided by CRSP®, we first develop a strategy which positions 100% into either Treasuries or the stock market based on the relationship between the 10-year Treasury and the 30-year Treasury.⁸ We show that the performance from positioning 100% in stocks or 100% in bonds based on our signal is higher than a buy and hold return of both asset classes, with lower risk than the stock market.

The theory behind why this strategy works relates ultimately to investor behavior during periods of anticipated stock market volatility, contractionary periods, and/or slowing growth and inflation expectations. Because Treasuries are considered a “risk-free” investment from the standpoint of credit worthiness, investors tend to position into longer duration bonds which benefit from “risk-off” periods. As near-term confidence grows, intermediate term duration Treasuries outperform their more defensively aggressive 30-year counterparts. The relative behavior between 10-year and 30-year bonds then serves as an anticipatory gauge of conditions that favor risk-taking due to near-term changes in the future outlook for risk assets.

⁸ 10-year Treasury and 30-year Treasury Total Return Indices were calculated (or derived) based on data from the University of Chicago on behalf of its Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP®) ©2014.

We also extend Tactical Risk Rotation to rebalancing in creating a strategy which adjusts target weights using the same relationship between the 10-year Treasury and 30-year Treasury. We show that risk adjusted returns and volatility are considerably better in using this strategy than a traditional rebalancing based on monthly intervals. We find this to be true for aggressive, moderate, and conservative iterations of our strategy. Finally, we propose ways of implementing Tactical Risk Rotation through the use of mutual funds and Exchange Traded Funds for active asset allocators and investment managers.

The All-In Strategy

We first test the validity of Tactical Risk Rotation by exploring the most extreme case of asset class rotation: a 100% portfolio shift. Our strategy positions a portfolio either fully into Treasuries or fully into equities based on the relative price performance of the 10-year Treasury and the 30-year Treasury.⁹ The strategy is descriptively named the Tactical Risk Rotation Strategy (“TRRS”) as it attempts to rotate into bonds during higher risk periods and into stocks during lower risk periods characterized by less volatility.¹⁰ Rotating into bonds in general and intermediate to longer

⁹ As a proxy for broad equity market exposure, we used the Fama/French U.S. Stock Market Index, which is a total return index. Source: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html

¹⁰ “TRRS 10” is the strategy version that uses the 10-year Treasury as its bond allocation. “TRRS 30” is the strategy version that uses the 30-year Treasury as its bond allocation.

duration Treasury bonds in particular during higher risk periods is effective because of their negative correlation with stocks during periods of market stress (see Table 1).


Table 1: Bond Correlation to the US Stock Market (1977 - 2013)			
Stock Market Performance	Barclays Aggregate	10-Year Treasury	30-Year Treasury
Positive	0.21	0.16	0.09
Negative	-0.02	-0.15	-0.15
Overall	0.03	0.08	0.21

We focused on the monthly time frame and developed the following trading rule:

When the 10-year Treasury total return is greater than the 30-year Treasury total return in the prior month, position into stocks for the following month. When the 10-year Treasury total return is less than the 30-year Treasury total return in the prior month, position into either the 10-year Treasury or 30-year Treasury for the following month.

Using available data from April 1977 through December 2013, both the TRRS 10 and the TRRS 30 outperform a buy-and-hold portfolio of the stock market, the 10-year Treasury, and the 30-year Treasury (see Chart 1).¹¹ The cumulative outperformance over the stock market is 32% for the TRRS 10 and 58% for the TRRS 30.

¹¹ Assuming no slippage and commission.



The true value of the Tactical Risk Rotation Strategy, though, is not simply in the cumulative return, but in the manner through which that cumulative return was achieved.


The TRRS was able to realize this outperformance while spending only 49.4% of the time in stocks. By limiting the time spent in equities to less than half of all months, the TRRS displayed significantly lower volatility and higher risk-adjusted returns than a buy-and-hold portfolio of the stock market. This is illustrated below in Table 2. Both the TRRS 30

and TRRS 10 achieved higher annualized returns with lower annualized volatility than the stock market, resulting in a higher Sharpe Ratio and higher Sortino Ratio than the stock market.¹² The annualized alpha created by the TTRS 30 and the TRRS 10 was significant at 4.3% and 3.7% per year.

Table 2: Performance and Risk Statistics (1977 - 2013)			
Metric	Stock Market	TRRS 30	TRRS 10
Annualized Returns	11.8%	13.2%	12.6%
Annualized Volatility	15.7%	14.8%	12.9%
Sharpe Ratio	0.43	0.55	0.58
Sortino Ratio	2.12	2.89	3.01
Beta	1.00	0.56	0.57
Annualized Alpha	0.0%	4.3%	3.7%

Importantly, this alpha generation is consistent over time, with the TRRS 10 producing positive alpha in 81% of rolling 36-month periods and the TRRS 30 producing positive alpha in 76% of rolling 36-month periods (see Chart 2).


¹² The TRRS 30 is the more volatile version of the strategy as the 30-year Treasury bond tends to exhibit higher volatility than the 10-year Treasury note over time. Both the Sharpe Ratio and Sortino Ratio are popular statistical measures which help in determining the efficiency of risk taken for return generated.



The primary factor behind this alpha creation was the tactical avoidance of risk. We test the robustness of this concept in a number of ways.

First, Chart 3 displays the rolling maximum drawdown of the TRRS 10 versus that of the stock market.¹³ The TRRS 10 has a significantly lower maximum drawdown during most periods, particularly during periods of market stress. Over the full time period studied, the maximum drawdown for the TRRS 10 was less than half of the stock market's maximum drawdown (-24.6% vs. -50.4%).

¹³ The TRRS 30 displays a similar drawdown pattern and maximum drawdown to the TRRS 10.



Second, the risk avoidance power of the TRRS can be illustrated in viewing its performance during up and down periods for the stock market. Table 3 below illustrates that over the full time period, the TRRS 10 and TRRS 30 achieved Up Capture of 64.5% and 66.4% respectively, while limiting Down Capture to 48.5% and 48.4%.

	Average Monthly Performance		Up/Down Capture	
	Up Stock Market	Down Stock Market	Up Capture	Down Capture
TRRS 10	2.5%	-1.5%	64.5%	48.5%
TRRS 30	2.6%	-1.4%	66.4%	48.4%
Stock Market	3.7%	-3.2%	100%	100%

A third way of illustrating the risk mitigation benefits of the strategy is to observe the volatility of the stock market when the TRRS was in stocks versus bonds. In Table 4, we see that the volatility of the stock market is 1% higher when the TRRS is in bonds. This indicates that the strategy was effective, on average, in rotating into more defensive bonds in advance of periods of higher volatility for stocks.

Table 4: Annualized Volatility		
Vol of Stock Market when TRRS in Bonds	Vol of Market when TRRS in Stocks	Differential
16.1%	15.1%	1.0%

While an annualized difference of 1% may seem small, the benefit of compounding in stocks during lower volatility periods and compounding in bonds during higher volatility periods is the primary reason for the strategy’s superior risk-adjusted returns.

A final way of testing the concept of risk avoidance is in calculating the percentage of time the TRRS was in bonds during down months and higher volatility periods for the stock market. We found that the TRRS was in bonds 53.1% of the time during down months, which is higher than the average time spent in bonds of 50.6%. Again, while this may not seem significant, by simply avoiding some of the worst months for stocks, one can achieve superior risk-adjusted returns. This is also confirmed in calculating the percentage of time the TRRS was in bonds during the highest levels of

the VIX index (since January 1990).¹⁴ We found that during months in which top decile levels of the VIX were observed (levels greater than 29.1), the TRRS was positioned in bonds 72.4% of the time, significantly higher than the average time spent in bonds.


Risk Avoidance and Mitigating Behavioral Biases

Before moving on, it is important to understand why risk avoidance and superior risk-adjusted returns are so critical, beyond the obvious benefits. As investors are inherently emotional beings, they are more likely to abandon a strategy with a higher drawdown and higher volatility at precisely the worst time. Regardless of their stated risk tolerance, when faced with a 50% drawdown in their stock portfolio, many investors will panic and begin to sell, likely near the low. This behavior was very clear in 2002 and 2009 at the tail end of bear markets that saw over 50% declines in equities. While no strategy can completely eliminate risk, the TRRS manages risk to a more acceptable level for most investors.

We see this first in observing the rolling annualized volatility of the TRRS 10 relative to the stock market (see Chart 4).¹⁵ The TRRS 10 shows lower volatility in 87% of rolling 12-month periods.

¹⁴ The VIX index is a popular measure of implied volatility of S&P 500 options, and is often referred to as the “fear gauge” of the stock market.

¹⁵ The TRRS 30 shows a similar (albeit less so as the 30-year is the more volatile instrument) improved volatility profile relative to the stock market.



We also see clear evidence of risk management in comparing calendar year returns, which investors tend to place a high level of importance on. The worst calendar years for the TRRS 10 and the TRRS 30 were -6% and -7.9% respectively, versus -36.6% for the stock market (see Table 5). The average investor is much more likely to stick with a strategy in which its worst year is -6-7% versus -36%. Therefore, the TRRS is, in effect, providing additional utility in that it is less likely to elicit a negative behavioral response from an investor.

Table 5: Calendar Year Returns			
Year	Stock Market	TRRS 10	TRRS 30
1977	3.1%	-1.4%	-0.4%
1978	8.0%	-0.5%	-0.3%
1979	23.4%	15.5%	13.9%
1980	33.4%	40.0%	33.8%
1981	-3.5%	-1.4%	-2.8%
1982	21.3%	39.9%	38.3%
1983	22.4%	8.7%	7.1%
1984	3.7%	2.6%	2.7%
1985	32.6%	27.7%	28.5%
1986	16.4%	32.3%	32.6%
1987	1.5%	-5.1%	-7.9%
1988	18.1%	12.7%	11.2%
1989	28.8%	15.0%	18.5%
1990	-6.1%	-3.5%	-0.7%
1991	34.8%	19.8%	19.5%
1992	9.7%	13.5%	12.5%
1993	11.1%	16.0%	19.5%
1994	-0.1%	-5.0%	-7.6%
1995	36.8%	32.4%	42.1%
1996	21.3%	21.5%	21.7%
1997	31.1%	20.6%	26.9%
1998	24.2%	16.3%	14.2%
1999	25.7%	22.0%	16.8%
2000	-11.8%	3.2%	4.1%
2001	-11.1%	11.8%	7.2%
2002	-21.2%	8.7%	11.3%
2003	31.8%	24.4%	24.9%
2004	11.9%	9.0%	11.2%
2005	6.0%	1.6%	5.7%
2006	15.4%	1.3%	-0.4%
2007	5.7%	8.3%	6.6%
2008	-36.6%	-6.0%	14.3%
2009	28.3%	21.7%	9.0%
2010	17.5%	18.6%	18.6%
2011	0.5%	14.4%	32.1%
2012	16.2%	14.0%	14.0%
2013	35.2%	17.4%	10.8%
Min	-36.6%	-6.0%	-7.9%
Max	36.8%	40.0%	42.1%

All-In Strategy vs. NBER Recession/Expansion Announcements

Expansionary periods tend to be characterized by lower overall volatility in financial markets, while contractionary periods tend to exhibit higher price fluctuations. A key component of the TRRS is its ability to identify more volatile periods for equities in advance of their occurrence. In using the relative performance between the 10-year Treasury and 30-year Treasury as our risk trigger, we are letting intermarket relationships define the economic cycle and are not simply relying on the standard definition of an expansion or contraction as determined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).¹⁶ This is important because by the time the NBER officially recognizes a period of contraction, the economy is well into a recession. Similarly, by the time the NBER recognizes the end of a recession and beginning of a recovery, the economy is well into the next expansion. We observe this fact in Table 6, which shows that the average lag time between the turning point in the economy and NBER official announcement was 12 months. The most recent example was the 2007-2009 recession, which ended in June 2009. NBER did not officially recognize this end date until September 2010, a full 16 months later. By that point, the stock market had already advanced over 80% from its low in March 2009.

¹⁶ Founded in 1920, the NBER is a research organization widely recognized as the definitive source for determining Business Cycle Expansion and Contraction dates in the U.S. www.nber.org.

Table 6: Turning Point vs. Announcement Date			
Peak or Trough	Turning Point Date	Announcement Date with Link	Lag (Months)
Trough	6/1/2009	9/20/2010	16
Peak	12/1/2007	12/1/2008	12
Trough	11/1/2001	7/17/2003	21
Peak	3/1/2001	11/26/2001	9
Trough	3/1/1991	12/22/1992	22
Peak	7/1/1990	4/25/1991	10
Trough	11/1/1982	7/8/1983	8
Peak	7/1/1981	1/6/1982	6
Trough	7/1/1980	7/8/1981	12
Peak	1/1/1980	6/3/1980	5
Average Lag (months)			12

Therefore, as bonds and stocks are known to be leading indicators of the economy and bonds tend to lead stocks over multiple cycles, a preferable strategy from an investment and trading standpoint is using market prices themselves to define economic cycles. This becomes immediately clear in observing the performance of the TRRS 10 versus a strategy that rotates into bonds (10-year Treasury note) or the stock market based on NBER announcement dates (see Table 7). In every risk and return metric, the TRRS 10 is superior and the NBER Strategy also underperforms a simple buy and hold stock portfolio. This leads us to conclude that investors would be better served ignoring such announcements as by the time the announcement occurs the market has long ago priced in the turning point in the economy.

Metric	Stock Market	TRRS 10	NBER Strategy
Cumulative Returns	5939%	7854%	3159%
Annualized Return	11.8%	12.6%	9.9%
Annualized Volatility	15.7%	12.9%	14.5%
Sharpe Ratio	0.43	0.58	0.33
Sortino Ratio	2.12	3.01	1.62
Max Drawdown	-50.4%	-24.6%	-43.8%
Beta	1.00	0.57	0.78
Annualized Alpha	0.00%	3.72%	-0.36%

Tactical Risk Rotation Through Rebalancing

Most fiduciaries recognize the importance of dynamic rebalancing. Over time, stock and bond relative weights will drift and could potentially result in a portfolio which has drastically different risk/return characteristics than would otherwise be appropriate for a client’s risk profile. The question of when to overweight and when to underweight an asset class, however, is illusory for most. One of the simpler approaches that avoids having to answer these questions is through continuous rebalancing of asset allocations to target weights, which are set forth in Investment Policy Statements.¹⁷ Using monthly, quarterly, or annual time frames, studies show that the contrarian nature of selling assets which outperform in favor of buying those which underperform over time reduces volatility without harming longer-term return.¹⁸

¹⁷ The “Investment Policy Statement” is a document drafted between a portfolio manager and a client that outlines general rules for the manager.

¹⁸ See Dichtl, Drobetz, and Wambach (2012).

In practice, there are a number of reasons why an all-in rotation strategy may be an unfeasible one for most, particularly money managers with discretionary authority over client accounts. First, a strategy that can rotate either completely into bonds or completely into stocks on a monthly basis may be too difficult to explain to clients, who are likely to question the merits of such an uncommon approach. Additionally, due to a lack of sophistication, clients may seek to abandon the strategy during inevitable short-term periods of underperformance. While this is true of any strategy, the underperformance in the all-in strategy will be glaring when it occurs as the strategy will be 100% in the underperforming asset class.¹⁹ Second, the volatility of the all-in strategy, while lower than the stock market, may still be too high for clients with a moderate or conservative risk tolerance. Finally, most advisors would not use the 10-year or 30-year Treasury as a proxy for fixed income exposure, preferring instead to use a more broad representation of the bond market. We address these concerns in developing an asset allocation strategy that is more suitable for the average investment advisor.

¹⁹ It is worth emphasizing that the real power of the Tactical Risk Rotation Strategy is in minimizing downside risk, rather than maximizing upside return over time. In 2013, the strategy had its worst year of relative underperformance against the broader stock market as Treasuries suffered from a historic shift and yield spike. While investors during that year may have exhibited home bias and questioned the strategy's validity, the longer-term results are undeniably strong precisely because of risk minimization.

In addressing the first concern, our asset allocation strategy is making incremental shifts to a mix of stocks and bonds and is not switching from 100% stocks to 100% bonds in every rotation. As to the second concern, we have developed three distinct asset allocation strategies based on an investor's risk tolerance: 1) Aggressive, 2) Moderate, and 3) Conservative. In addressing the third concern, we used the Barclays Aggregate Bond Index as the fixed income portion of the portfolio, representing a more diversified exposure to the bond market.

Aggressive Asset Allocation Model

We first developed a rebalancing rule for the Aggressive category. The default allocation is an 80% weighting to the stock market and a 20% weighting to the Barclays Aggregate Bond Index. In months where the 10-year Treasury outperformed the 30-year Treasury (expansionary signal), the portfolio is rebalanced to this 80/20 mix of stocks and bonds. In months where the 30-year Treasury outperformed the 10-year Treasury (contractionary signal), the portfolio is rebalanced to a lower equity allocation and higher bond allocation. We tested a range of weights in 5% increments from the standard 80/20 allocation. The most defensive rebalancing moved the portfolio to a 50/50 split between equities and bonds.

The results are shown in Table 8. We first note that in confirmation of prior research on the subject, a simple monthly rebalancing lowers overall volatility and improves risk-adjusted returns.²⁰ This can be seen in comparing the “Monthly Rebal” column with the “No Rebal” column.

Table 8: Aggressive Asset Allocation								
	No Rebal	Monthly Rebal	Tactical Risk Rebalancing					
Default Risk Rebalance	None	80/20	75/25	70/30	65/35	60/40	55/45	50/50
Annualized Returns	11.3%	11.2%	11.2%	11.3%	11.3%	11.3%	11.3%	11.3%
Annualized Volatility	14.1%	12.8%	12.5%	12.2%	11.9%	11.7%	11.4%	11.2%
Sharpe Ratio	0.44	0.48	0.49	0.50	0.52	0.53	0.54	0.55
Sortino Ratio	1.89	2.23	2.29	2.34	2.40	2.45	2.50	2.54
Max Drawdown	-47%	-42%	-40%	-39%	-37%	-36%	-34%	-33%
Beta	0.90	0.81	0.79	0.77	0.75	0.73	0.71	0.69
Annualized Alpha	0.2%	0.7%	0.8%	1.0%	1.1%	1.3%	1.4%	1.6%
Avg Exposure to Stocks	89%	80%	77%	75%	72%	70%	67%	65%
Avg Exposure to Bonds	11%	20%	23%	25%	28%	30%	33%	35%

Next, we can see that volatility and risk adjusted returns are further improved with Tactical Risk Rebalancing. Each 5% move from the standard 80/20 weighting shows an incremental improvement in the Sharpe Ratio, Sortino Ratio, and Annualized Alpha. Similar to the all-in strategy, this is largely a function of risk rotation accomplished by moving out of equities in advance of higher periods of volatility for the stock market.

The most extreme rebalancing, to a 50/50 split during contractionary periods, achieved the highest risk-adjusted returns and outperformed a monthly rebalancing strategy while maintaining only a 65% average exposure to stocks.

²⁰ Arnott and Lovell (1993).

Moderate Asset Allocation Model

The second strategy was developed for a moderate risk investor, with the default weighting of 60% stocks and 40% bonds. Using the same methodology as the Aggressive rebalancing, we see similar results in Table 9. There was an improvement in risk-adjusted returns with each incremental shift. The most extreme form of strategy, a rebalancing to 30% stocks and 70% bonds during contractionary periods, was the optimal portfolio from a risk-adjusted return standpoint.

Table 9: Moderate Asset Allocation								
	No Rebalance	Monthly Rebalance	Tactical Risk Rebalancing					
Default Risk Rebalance	None	60/40	55/45	50/50	45/55	40/60	35/65	30/70
Annualized Returns	10.7%	10.5%	10.5%	10.5%	10.5%	10.5%	10.5%	10.5%
Annualized Volatility	12.3%	10.1%	9.8%	9.5%	9.3%	9.1%	8.9%	8.7%
Sharpe Ratio	0.46	0.53	0.55	0.57	0.58	0.60	0.61	0.62
Sortino Ratio	2.17	2.45	2.51	2.57	2.63	2.69	2.74	2.78
Max Drawdown	-41%	-32%	-30%	-29%	-27%	-25%	-23%	-22%
Beta	0.78	0.63	0.61	0.59	0.57	0.54	0.52	0.50
Annualized Alpha	0.43%	1.19%	1.34%	1.49%	1.63%	1.77%	1.91%	2.04%
Avg Exposure to Stocks	76%	60%	57%	55%	52%	50%	47%	45%
Avg Exposure to Bonds	24%	40%	43%	45%	48%	50%	53%	55%

Conservative Asset Allocation Model

The last strategy was developed for a conservative investor, with the default weighting of 30% stocks and 70% bonds. Again, using the same methodology outlined above, we see an improvement in risk-adjusted returns and lower drawdowns (see Table 10). The most extreme form of the strategy, which moved stock exposure down to 0% during contractionary periods, was again the strongest in terms of risk-adjusted returns. This

portfolio achieved an annualized return of only 0.1% less than standard rebalancing while cutting average exposure to equities in half (30% to 15%).

Table 10: Conservative Asset Allocation								
	No Rebalance	Monthly Rebalance	Tactical Risk Rebalancing					
Default Risk Rebalance	None	30/70	25/75	20/80	15/85	10/90	5/95	0/100
Annualized Returns	9.6%	9.3%	9.3%	9.2%	9.2%	9.2%	9.2%	9.2%
Annualized Volatility	8.8%	6.7%	6.5%	6.3%	6.2%	6.1%	6.1%	6.1%
Sharpe Ratio	0.51	0.62	0.64	0.65	0.66	0.67	0.67	0.66
Sortino Ratio	2.36	2.68	2.73	2.78	2.81	2.83	2.84	2.82
Max Drawdown	-28%	-15%	-13.0%	-11.3%	-9.5%	-8.3%	-7.6%	-7.7%
Beta	0.52	0.35	0.33	0.31	0.29	0.27	0.25	0.23
Annualized Alpha	1.00%	1.80%	1.93%	2.06%	2.19%	2.31%	2.43%	2.54%
Avg Exposure to Stocks	48%	30%	27%	25%	22%	20%	17%	15%
Avg Exposure to Bonds	52%	70%	73%	75%	78%	80%	83%	85%

Modern-Day Implementation

We recognize that many investors do not have access to CRSP® total return data for 10-year and 30-year Treasuries. With the advent of an increasing subset of Exchange-Traded Funds and no-load mutual funds, an investor could replicate the TRRS and Asset Allocation Models above.

First, in replicating the signal, the instruments that currently resemble the 10-year Treasury and 30-year Treasury most closely are the iShares 7-10 Year Treasury Bond (IEF) and the iShares 20+ Year Treasury Bond (TLT). From the inception of these ETFs in July 2002, the signal produced from their total returns was similar in 95% of months to the signal generated from the CRSP® data.

Next, in replicating the available instruments, investors could choose from a variety of products.

In the all-in strategy, substitutes for the Fama-French Stock Index include the Vanguard Total Market ETF (VTI), the Vanguard Total Stock Market Index Fund (VTSMX), and any other Total U.S. Stock Market product. Substitutes for the 10-year Treasury note include the iShares 7-10 Year Treasury Bond (IEF), the Vanguard Intermediate Bond Fund (VBIIX), and any other Treasury bond product with an average maturity of close to 10 years. Substitutes for the 30-year Treasury bond include the iShares 20+ Year Treasury Bond (TLT), the Vanguard Long-Term Bond Index Fund (VBLTX), and any other product with an average maturity of close to 30 years.

In the rebalancing strategies, the substitutes for the stock portfolio are the Vanguard Total Market ETF (VTI), the Vanguard Total Stock Market Index Fund (VTSMX), and any other Total U.S. Stock Market product. Substitutes for the Barclays Aggregate Bond Index include the iShares Barclays Aggregate Bond Fund (AGG), the Vanguard Total Bond Market ETF (BND), the Vanguard Total Bond Market Index Fund (VBMFX), and any other total U.S. bond market product.

While our above analysis did not incorporate fees, commission, slippage, or taxes, we would also note the following:

- 1) All of the products listed above are passive funds at the lowest end of the fee spectrum currently available to investors.
- 2) The products listed are also at the highest end of the liquidity spectrum where slippage is not a concern.
- 3) Both the TRRS and the Rebalancing Strategy are not extremely active, with the TRRS shifting the portfolio roughly every two months and the Rebalancing Strategy moving the portfolio monthly.
- 4) With this level of frequency, commission levels would be de minimis and not likely to alter returns. Additionally, an account housed within Vanguard could buy/sell both Vanguard mutual funds and Vanguard ETFs without incurring a commission. In this case, the transaction fee would be \$0.
- 5) There are tax implications in the TRRS and Rebalancing Strategy which could reduce overall returns. If executed in a non-taxable account (IRA, 401k, etc.), this would not be an issue. In a taxable account, one would generate additional short-term capital gains which is sub-optimal from a tax perspective, though the risk reduction benefits over time may outweigh this.

6) Overall, a non-taxable account housed at one of the major brokerage firms that offer no-fee trades for their products would be the best way to approximate the strategy at minimal cost.

Conclusion

We find that the signaling power of Treasury bonds is a market anomaly that has persisted over time. The relationship between the total return of the 10-year Treasury and the 30-year Treasury in particular contains important information about future volatility in markets. Contrary to the Efficient Market Hypothesis, this information does not appear to be priced in immediately by broad market averages, and therefore is exploitable.

The implications from both a strategy and signaling standpoint are meaningful. We find that by using a Tactical Risk Rotation Strategy based on the relationship between intermediate and long duration bonds, one could have outperformed a buy and hold strategy over time with lower risk. This finding is contrary to the widely accepted notions of risk and return dictated by the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and Security Market Line (SML).

Outperformance is achieved by timing exposure to risk using a monthly relative performance signal of the 10-year Treasury to the 30-year Treasury. The strategy rotates into equities when the investing environment

favors risk-taking and into bonds when the investing environment favors capital preservation. Importantly, because the Tactical Risk Rotation Strategy spends more than half of its time in bonds, it also benefits from lower volatility and higher compounding of interest.

The key to the strategy's outperformance, though, was in the tactical avoidance of risk. Specifically, when the 30-year Treasury is outperforming the 10-year Treasury, it often serves as a warning sign of increased volatility in the equity market during a "risk-off" environment.

We also find that a Rebalancing Strategy based on the same risk signal produces higher risk-adjusted returns with lower average exposure to equities than a simple monthly rebalancing. This was true for aggressive, moderate, and conservative allocations. The critical component was once again the avoidance of risk by holding a higher percentage of bonds during periods of higher stock market volatility.

The avoidance of risk is especially important for investment advisors and other fiduciaries, who recognize that the business of portfolio management is as much about managing client behavior as it is about managing money. Real-time access to accounts and a constant flow of information from the financial media about short-term market movements often results in emotionally-driven responses from clients. Needless to say,

these responses tend to be suboptimal and are the primary cause of the gap seen between investor returns and average mutual fund returns.²¹ This behavior is most evident during periods of heightened volatility and market stress, when investors may force their advisors to reduce risk and sell out of positions due to loss aversion. Meanwhile, home bias in strong up years for stocks can result in excessive risk taking and the termination of a manager who underperforms.²² Both situations are highly counterproductive as they are entirely reactionary and completely disregard the investor's risk profile. While advisors who have discretionary authority over an account can attempt to counteract this adverse behavior, obeying a client's wishes (even if it is against his or her best interest) can be the difference between keeping those assets, and losing them. Tactical Risk Rotation offers a potential solution to this problem.

Further Research

Although beyond the scope of this paper, there are a number of broader implications that our findings may have on the investing and trading landscape. As it relates to trading and the timing of volatility,

²¹ See Frazzini and Lamont (2008).

²² Both loss aversion and home bias are terms advanced in the field of behavioral finance and economics. Loss aversion relates to the idea that people feel the pain for portfolio losses more acutely than the joy of the same portfolio gain. Home bias causes people to want to overweight domestic equities in favor of global diversification, which in turn causes clients to benchmark their portfolios to popular domestic indices regardless of portfolio construction.

further research could study the benefit of: (1) implementing option overlay strategies around the risk signal²³, (2) hedging around the risk signal, (3) timing of gross exposure or leverage around the risk signal, and (4) developing a risk signal within shorter time frames (using daily or weekly data). As it relates to asset allocation, further research could study: (1) implementing Tactical Risk Rotation on portfolios with additional asset classes, (2) applying an overweight or underweight to specific sectors within the equity allocation (ex: cyclical or defensive), and (3) applying an overweight or underweight to specific areas within the bond allocation (ex: high yield or treasuries).

²³ The “risk signal” is when the 30-year Treasury is outperforming the 10-year Treasury.

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